Gibbs v. Babbitt: Red Wolf Protection under the Endangered Species Act Leaps beyond the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause by Bowlin, John M. & Brewer, Eric M.
Public Land and Resources Law Review
Volume 23
Gibbs v. Babbitt: Red Wolf Protection under the
Endangered Species Act Leaps beyond the Outer
Limits of the Commerce Clause
John M. Bowlin
Eric M. Brewer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Land
and Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
23 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 221 (2002)
Gibbs v. Babbitt:
Red Wolf Protection Under the Endangered Species Act
Leaps Beyond the "Outer Limits" of the Commerce Clause
John M. Bowlin & Eric M. Brewer
I. INTRODUC ON
Since the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 19731 (ESA),
the federal government has taken a rigid stance in an effort to halt extinc-
tions of both flora and fauna.2 Utilizing regulatory powers incorporated
into the ESA, federal agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
have established effective, conservation-based initiatives to enhance the re-
covery of threatened and endangered wildlife.3 Through wildlife reestab-
lishment programs devoted to species and habitat protection, many animals
driven to the brink of extinction by the mid-twentieth century have made
remarkable comebacks directly due to ESA initiatives.4
To a large extent, wildlife conservation has been met with public ap-
proval.' Concern for endangered and threatened species during the 1970s
forced both the government and the people to recognize the value of our
Nation's wildlife.6 However, not everyone has been pleased. In recent
years, FWS management policies involving endangered species, especially
large predators, have been targeted by special interest groups.7 Some critics
accuse the FWS of engaging in tactics which violate constitutional rights.'
The tenor of these disconcerted voices rings out loudly, demanding domin-
ion over the land they own.
Gibbs v. Babbitt9 delves into the heart of this conflict. In Gibbs, North
Carolina; Charles Gilbert Gibbs; Richard Lee Mann; Washington County,
North Carolina; and Hyde County, North Carolina (Plaintiffs) alleged that
the ESA anti-taking regulations ° protecting red wolves exceeded Con-
gress' authority under the Commerce Clause." Ultimately, the Fourth Cir-
cuit validated both the anti-taking regulation and the overall legitimacy of
the ESA regulations involving species protected under the Commerce
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1998).
2. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000).
3. Id.
4. Shannon Petersen, Comment, 29 Envtl. L. 463, 466 (1999).
5. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
6. Id. at 487.
7. Id. at 489.
8. Id. at 489.
9. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
10. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (1998).
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. See generally, Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483.
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Clause. Upon first impression, the Fourth Circuit's decision appears to
send a strong message to other courts suggesting that when considering
environmental legislation, it is acceptable to stretch the parameters of the
Commerce Clause to fit the facts at issue. However, a close examination of
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the regulable "outer limits" of
the Commerce Clause reveals that such an ad hoc interpretation is likely to
exceed recently established guidelines. In reality, even though the decision
is a triumph for wolves, the effect on future environmental litigation will
probably be negligible because it is grounded upon murky legal principles.
A. History of the North American Red Wolf
The saga of North American red wolf is bitter sweet. Undoubtedly one
of the most vilified creatures roaming the wild lands of our nation, this
unique species has been surrounded by both myths and misinformation for
centuries. From the time settlers began raising livestock in wolf country,
conflicts between humans and the red wolf have been both constant and
bloody, with humankind faring far better than the red wolf.13
However, contrary to the skewed portrait of red wolves as painted by
the brush of ignorance, an accurate examination of the species reveals one
of the most fascinating creatures to inhabit the continent. For example, red
wolves, like humankind, rely upon cooperative behavior to survive. 4 Ad-
ditionally, adult members pair with life long mates and exist in communal
units usually consisting of an adult breeding pair, young of the year, and
young of the previous year.'5 After a family unit is established, they will
hunt and forage as a group, thus increasing their chances for success and
survival. 16
Red wolves are carnivorous predators that, when driven by hunger,
draw little distinction between eating wild game, domesticated sheep, or
even the family pet. Despite their infamous reputation as a veracious
predator, small prey such as raccoons, rabbits, and ground dwelling birds
constitute the majority of their diet.' 7 In fact, predation by wolves provides
critical habitat advantages to not only the ecosystem but also to fanning and
ranching activities by controlling herbivorous prey species that compete
with farming and ranching activities.' s Unfortunately, due to initial con-
flicts between humans and the red wolf, any benefits generated by the spe-
13. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488.
14. Rachel E. Wells, Wolf Song of an Alaska Volunteer http://alaska.net/-wolfsong/redwolf.html
(Last updated Mar. 22, 2002).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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cies were not fully explored until their numbers had dropped to critical
levels. 19
Regrettably, though red wolves impart a benefit to the overall stability
of the ecosystem, because their predatory nature often conflicts with man's
activities, they have been targeted by livestock owners, market hunters, and
trappers for centuries.20 Prior to the mid-1 800s, red wolves thrived in river-
ine habitats from southern Florida to central Texas, extending as far north
as Kentucky and Carolinas.21 Agricultural activities combined with
predator control, loss of habitat, loss of prey species, and competition from
coyotes expanding into their range served to reduce red wolf numbers to the
point of near extinction by the 1960s.22 Additionally, hybridization be-
tween the remaining red wolves and coyotes served to dilute the genetic
identity of the red wolf genus, further threatening the genetic uniqueness of
the species.23 In 1967, the red wolf was officially listed under the ESA as
an endangered species, and in the early 1970s, research conducted by the
FWS documented only seventeen full-blooded red wolves, all of which
were scattered along the Sabine River adjacent to the Texas-Louisiana bor-
der.24 Finally, in 1976, steps were taken to save the species from extinc-
tion, and in a program initiated by the FWS, the remaining wolves were
trapped and placed into captive breeding programs in hopes of reestablish-
ing a viable breeding population.'
The breeding program was successful, and in 1986 the FWS outlined
plans to reintroduce red wolves into the Alligator River National Wildlife
Refuge in eastern North Carolina. 6 The Alligator River site was chosen
because it provided optimal habitat for the species, a low density of human
inhabitants, adequate numbers of small prey species, and an absence of feral
dogs and coyotes. 27 In 1987, the FWS released four pairs of captive wolves
into the refuge as an "experimental" population.28 The "experimental" clas-
sification is given to reintroduced populations that are considered "nones-
sential" to the continued existence of the endangered species.29
Experimental populations like the red wolf are subjected to the federal
19. Wolf Song of an Alaska Volunteer http://alaska.net/-wolfsong/redwolf.html.
20. Id.
21. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488.
22. L.
23. Wolf Song of an Alaska Volunteer http://alaska.net/-wolfsongred.wolf.html.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 15390) (1982).
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regulatory control of the FWS which provides more liberal management
than traditionally afforded under te ESA.30 With the red wolves, the FWS
extended the takings provisions under §10(j), thus allowing landowners to
kill a red wolf under certain circumstances.3" Motives for relaxing the tak-
ings provision were two-fold. First, the experimental designation allowed
the FWS to introduce the red wolf into an area unoccupied by the species.3"
Second, in anticipation of concerns and fears from ranchers and farmers, the
FWS allowed individuals to take a red wolf on private land, "[p]rovided
that such taking is not intentional or willful, or is in defense of that person's
own life or the life of others."33 Additionally, private landowners are per-
mitted to take a red wolf when the animal is in the act of killing livestock or
pets, and may harass wolves by nonlethal methods. 4
From 1987 to 1996, the "experimental" red wolf population increased
from eight to seventy-five animals.35 As the wolves' numbers increased, so
did their home range, and by 1994 approximately forty-one of the seventy-
five animals migrated off the refuge and were residing on private land.36
Naturally, as the wolves became established on private lands, their contact
with, and predation on, privately-owned livestock increased, as did protests
within the agricultural community.37
Unfortunately, efforts to quell apprehension vis-a-vis relaxed taking
provisions did not eliminate all conflicts or legal challenges. In October
1990, Richard Lee Mann shot and killed a red wolf on his property, main-
taining the animal threatened the safety of his cattle.38 Mann's actions re-
sulted in his federal prosecution under 50 C.F.R. §17.84 (c), which initiated
public outcry questioning the equity of federal regulations controlling the
illegal taking of red wolves. 39 From 1992 through 1994, surrounding com-
munities enacted resolutions opposing red wolf reintroductions, and the
North Carolina Department of Agriculture formally protested the red wolf
program.4 In 1994, the North Carolina General Assembly responded by
passing "An Act to Allow the Trapping and Killing of Red Wolves by
30. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c).
31. Id.
32. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (1998).
33. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c)(4)(i).
34. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
35. ld.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 489.
38. Id.
39. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489 (Mann plead guilty and was sentenced to community service of build-
ing shelters for red wolves in captivity).
40. Id.
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Owners of Private Land",4 ' which challenged federal regulations.42 Specif-
ically, the Act made it legal to kill a red wolf in four North Carolina Coun-
ties if the animal was on private property, the landowner reasonably be-
lieved the wolf was a threat to people and/or livestock, and the landowner
had made previous requests to the FWS to remove the wolf from the prop-
erty in question.4 3 Needless to say, this Act was in direct conflict with
federal regulations under the ESA.
Disagreements between North Carolina red wolf reintroduction oppo-
nents and the federal government climaxed on March 3, 1997, when a com-
plaint was filed in the United Sates District Court for the eastern District of
North Carolina against Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service; United States Department of Interior; and
Jamie Clark, Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (De-
fendants).'
The Plaintiffs alleged the federal government violated the Tenth
Amendment by restricting the taking of red wolves on private land. 5 Cross
motions for summary judgement were filed, and the court granted the De-
fendants' summary judgement maintaining the ESA regulation restricting
the taking of red wolves was a legitimate exercise of federal power under
the Commerce Clause.4 6 The Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, arguing the anti-taking regulation imposed by
the FWS in regard to the red wolf exceeded Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.47
B. Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision a4 concluding
that the anti-taking regulation protected the red wolf on public and private
lands, and that the overall ESA regulatory scheme involving the species
was a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause on two distinct
fronts. First, the court held that economic and commercial activities red
wolves promulgate in the areas of tourism, scientific research, potential fu-
ture fur trade, and agribusiness substantially affected interstate commerce
subjecting them to federal regulatory authority under the Commerce
41. Statute legalizing killing a red wolf on private property if the landowner previously requested
FWS to remove the wolf. 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws Ch. 635, § 1.
42. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498.
43. l at 489.
44. 1l at 483.
45. Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
46. Id. at 536.
47. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
48. Il at 505, cert denied, Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
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Clause.49 Second, the court held that eviscerating the anti-taking clause of
the red wolf reintroduction program would seriously weaken the entire ESA
regulatory scheme, thereby unquestionably affecting interstate commerce. 50
II. BACKGROUND LAW
When investigating the saga of the red wolf, it is necessary to not only
examine how the red wolf fits into the ESA regulatory scheme, but also
whether the red wolf enjoys protection under the Commerce Clause. This
investigation requires an analysis of both the ESA and an historical sum-
mary of the Commerce Clause.
A. ESA Legislation: Red Wolves as an "Experimental Species"
Due to the success of the captive breeding program, prior to reintro-
ducing the red wolf in North Carolina, the animal's endangered species sta-
tus was legally reclassified as an "experimental" reintroduction species.51
The "experimental" classification is given to reintroduced populations that
are considered "nonessential" to the continued existence of the species."2
Under the "experimental" classification, a species is treated as threatened
rather than endangered, thus allowing the FWS to establish less restrictive
regulations regarding management policies.53 In the case of the red wolf,
the "nonessential" status allowed the FWS to liberalize the taking regula-
tion applied to the species. 4 This increased flexibility was authorized by
Congress in 1982 when the ESA was substantially rewritten." In the case
of the red wolf, regulatory flexibility was designed to facilitate local accept-
ance.56 Originally, under U.S.C. 16 § 1538(a)(1)(B)(2002), the taking pro-
vision prohibited harassing, harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting, wound-
ing, trapping, capturing, or collecting any endangered species.57 However,
the red wolf reintroduction plan permit a person to take a wolf on private
land when: 1) the taking is not willful or intentional; 2) the taking is done in
defense of the person's life or the lives of others; 3) the wolves are in the
act of killing livestock or pets, and there is evidence of freshly killed live-
stock or pets; and 4) after efforts to capture wolves by the FWS are aban-
49. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497.
50. Id. at 498.
51. Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
52. Id. at 532 note 2; see generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2002).
53. lId at 532 note 2; see generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(C).
54. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 487.
55. Id. at 487; see generally, Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982 97 Pub. L. 304, 96
Stat. 1411 (Oct. 13, 1982).
56. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 487.
57. Id.
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doned and the takings are approved in writing (subject to a 24-hour report-
ing requirement).58 In addition, red wolf regulations allow landowners to
harass wolves by nonlethal or injurious methods.59
B. Commerce Clause
Throughout the development of our Nation's legal system, congres-
sional regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause has evolved signif-
icantly. Legal scholars have identified shifting judicial opinions regarding
the boundaries of the Commerce Clause between 1824 and 2002.60 Modem
Commerce Clause jurisprudence developed in the wake of the Gibbons v.
Ogden decision.6" In Gibbons, the Court recognized the broad and expan-
sive power Congress wields in regulating intrastate activities that affect in-
terstate commerce. 62 The decision established a precedent that stood for
almost a century: Commerce Clause issues primarily addressed instances of
state laws burdening interstate commerce and did not consider the scope of
congressional Commerce Clause power.63
The regulatory power of the Commerce Clause was not significantly
challenged again until the 1990s. In fact, the limits to federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause were continually broadened over the next sev-
enty-one years. For instance, following the Great Depression, the federal
government began to reassess the problems instigated by the laissez-faire
approach to business. With this reassessment came tighter federal control
and expansion of the regulable "outer limits" of commerce. 6 Indeed, fol-
lowing the Great Depression, the federal regulatory power over activities
affecting interstate commerce continued to expand significantly until
1995.65
The seminal case for this era was the 1937 Supreme Court decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.66 In NLRB, the Plaintiffs charged
that the Steel Corporation had violated rules applying to unfair labor prac-
tices.6 7 The Steel Corporation alleged that the law was not subject to regu-
58. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c)(4)(i-1 I 1,v).
59. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c)(4)(iv).
60. J. Blanding Holman, IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 Va. Envtl. W. 139, 141-148 (1995).
61. Id. at 140-43 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 196-7 (1824).
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 196-7 (1824).
63. Holman, supra note 60, at 142.
64. Id.
65. Eric Brignac, Recent Development: The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endan-
gered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C.L. Rev. 873, 873-74 (2001).
66. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
67. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 5.
2002]
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lation under the Commerce Clause because it involved intrastate activities,
not interstate activities.68 The Court held that activities having a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce were within the scope of the Commerce
Clause, even if the activities were precipitated by intrastate means.69 Es-
sentially, NLRB paved the way for courts to apply "rational review" analy-
sis when determining if an activity was subject to congressional regulation
under the Commerce Clause.70 Under the rationality review identified in
NLRB, if an activity was either directly or indirectly related to interstate
commerce, it was subject to federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause.7'
Following NLRB, Wickard v. Filburn tested the breadth of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.72 Wickard involved an Ohio fanner's violation of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA), precipitated by his producing
more wheat than he was allotted under the AAA. Even though Mr. Wick-
ard was allowed to farm only ten acres under the AAA, he farmed twenty-
three acres, and utilized the surplus for personal consumption.73 Though
his actions were small, and seemingly insignificant, the Court found they
were regulable under the Commerce Clause.74 The Court held various ac-
tivities were regulable under the Commerce Clause if they arose out of
transactions, which when viewed in the aggregate, could significantly affect
interstate commerce.75  According to Wickard, any activity could be
reached by Congress if the activity had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
76
Over the next sixty years, the scope of the federal regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause continued expanding, giving Congress virtual
plenary power in regard to the regulation of commerce.77 However, in
1995, for the first time in over 100 years, the Court held that Congress had
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lo-
pez.78 The Lopez decision served to redefine the "judicially enforceable
68. Id. at 25.
69. Id. at 37.
70. Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC,
and Gibbs, 31 Envtl. L. Rev. 10414 (2001).
71. Id.
72. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
73. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
74. Id. at 132.
75. Id. at 127-28.
76. Heather Hale, Note, United States v. Lopez: Resisting Further Expansion of Congressional
Authority Under the Commerce Power, 1996 Det. C. L. Rev. 99, 108 (1996).
77. Id. at 109.
78. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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outer limits" of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.79
The question in Lopez centered around whether the possession of a
firearm in a school zone was an activity that substantially affected interstate
commerce. s0 Alfonzo Lopez was a twelfth grade San Antonio, Texas stu-
dent convicted under the Gun-Free School Zones Act (Act)8" for possession
of a concealed .38-caliber pistol and five bullets in a school zone.8" To
summarize, the Act made the possession of a firearm within a school zone a
federal offense. 3 Lopez alleged Congress exceeded the scope of its author-
ity under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Act.8 4 The Court ana-
lyzed the Act in the light of three acknowledged categories of what Con-
gress could regulate under the Commerce Clause.85
"First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of inter-
state commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Con-
gress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce."
86
The Court focused on whether guns in school zones substantially affects
interstate commerce in determining if Congress had overstepped the bounds
of the Commerce Clause.87 In explaining the last category of what may be
regulated, the Court stated, "the proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce. 88.
The majority in Lopez gave four compelling reasons the Act was un-
constitutional under the Commerce Clause: 1) the statute had nothing to do
with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, no matter how broadly
the terms are defined; 2) the Act contained no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce; 3) the Act contained no express con-
gressional findings confirming the effect of guns in school zones on inter-
79. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
80. IdM at 551.
81. Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(9)(1)(A)(2002).
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 552.
85. Id. at 558.
86. Id. at 558-59.
87. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
88. Id.
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state commerce; and 4) any connection between guns in schools and eco-
nomic ramifications was too attenuated.8 9 However, even though the Court
held that the Act exceeded the limits of Commerce Clause regulatory au-
thority, the majority suggested that had there been any type of legislative
findings linking the possession of firearms with interstate commerce, the
Court would be favorably disposed to consider such findings. 90
Additionally, the Court affirmed rationality review as the proper
means for analyzing a statute challenged under the Commerce Clause.9
However, it is generally thought that Lopez increased the burden by using a
"rational basis with teeth analysis."92 Prior to the Lopez decision, the Court
in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, formulated the rational
review as: 1) whether Congress had a rational basis for its determination
that the activity in question affected commerce; and 2) if it had a rational
basis, whether the means selected to regulate this activity were reasonable
and appropriate. 93 Heart of Atlanta involved an Atlanta motel's refusal to
rent rooms to African Americans.94 The Court applied the "cumulative ef-
fects" test set forth in Wickard and concluded that because seventy-five
percent of the motel's guests were from out of state, racial discrimination in
the lodging industry discouraged travel by certain minority groups, thus
when examined in aggregate, these instances substantially effected inter-
state commerce.95 Heart of Atlanta is a prime example of Congress assert-
ing broad and expressive powers vis-a-vis the Commerce Clause. However,
following Lopez, the Court implemented additional hurdles under ration re-
view, hence the denomination "rational review with teeth."
The first significant case to apply the judicial parameters established in
Lopez was United States v. Morrison.9 6 In Morrison, the Court was faced
with deciding whether the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to create
a federal civil action on the basis of gender motivated violence.97 The act
challenged by Morrison was the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 98
The Court examined the case under the framework set forth in Lo-
pez.99 Morrison affirmed the three categories established in Lopez, focus-
89. Id. at 567.
90. Holman, supra note 60 at 149-50.
91. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
92. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490.
93. 379 U.S. 241, 258-59.
94. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258-59.
95. Id.
96. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
97. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
99. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-609.
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ing on whether the regulated activity substantially affected interstate com-
merce to determine what could be regulated by Congress under the Com-
merce Clause. 10 The Court used the Lopez test to determine if the
economic impact of the VAWA was too attenuated to validate the law under
the Commerce Clause. 01
First, the Court explained the activity regulated, as in Lopez, was not
economic in nature.10 2 "Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity."10 3 The Court admitted that it
had allowed purely intrastate activities to be regulated in the past, but only
when the activity was "economic in nature." 0" The petitioner argued that
economic findings offered as evidence directly supported the contention
that violence perpetrated against women does have an overall, aggregated
effect on interstate commerce.105 However, the Court found that even if
there was an indirect effect on interstate commerce due to violence against
women, it lacked the "but-for" causal chain. 0 6 Absent this causal connec-
tion, violence against women was too attenuated to permit federal regula-
tion under the Commerce Clause.107 Therefore, the Court held this was a
matter for states to regulate under their police powers.10 Hence, the Court,
as in Lopez, found no jurisdictional element "establishing that the federal
cause of action is pursuant to Congress' power to regulate interstate com-
merce. 
109
Next, unlike Lopez, the record in Morrison demonstrated that Con-
gress had made extensive findings on the economic impact of gender moti-
vated violence.110 However, the Court stated Congress' conclusion that a
certain activity "substantially affects interstate commerce" does not neces-
sarily make it so.111 Though it is helpful if Congress has made findings
supporting the effect on interstate commerce, it is not dispositive.1 12 Deter-
mination of whether an activity affects interstate commerce is ultimately a
100. Id. at 609.
101. Id. at 610-12.
102. 1l at 610.
103. Id. at 613.
104. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
105. Id. at 615-16.
106. Id. at 615.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 618.
109. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
110. I& at 614.
111. Id. at 614.
112. Id
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question for the Court, not the legislature." 3
Finally, the Court considered whether the effect on commerce was too
attenuated." 4 The Court refused to accept the argument that, but for vio-
lence against women, women would participate more fully in intestate com-
merce. 1 5 The Court countered: "If accepted, [this] reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide aggregated im-
pact.. .has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or con-
sumption."1
6
The decision in both Lopez and Morrison narrowed the boundaries of
the "outer limits" of regulable authority under the Commerce Clause. How-
ever, both of these cases have been harshly criticized as being too imprecise
and ambiguous to serve as a predictable measure of congressional regula-
tory authority." 17 The primary concern voiced by critics is that even though
the Court maintained that rational basis analysis was not abandoned in Lo-
pez or Morrison, the majority struck down the legislation on a stricter pre-
mise than utilized previously in rational based analysis."' Most of the dis-
sension centers around the Court's distinction between economic and
noneconomic activities." 9 Commentators suggest that because the Consti-
tution makes no distinction between the regulation of economic versus
noneconomic activities affecting interstate commerce, Lopez and Morrison
have essentially rewritten the Constitution.'20 Critics believe the Court's
failure to strictly define what constitutes economic activity will become fer-
tile ground for inconsistent interpretation and application of what consti-
tutes interstate commerce and what types of activities are regulable under
the Commerce Clause. 121
Ill. GIBBS V. BABBITT
In the wake of Morrison, Gibbs v. Babbitt moved to center-stage, chal-
lenging the boundaries of the types of economic activities a court will deem
regulable under the Commerce Clause. In Gibbs, the Federal District Court
of North Carolina concluded that the reestablishment of red wolves was an
economic activity significantly affecting interstate commerce, and therefore
113. Id.
114. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
115. Id. at 615.
116. Id. at 615.
117. Dral & Phillips, supra note 70.
118. Dral & Phillips, supra note 70.
119. Il
120. Id.
121. Id.
GIBBS V. BABBITT
regulable under the Commerce Clause.' 22 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) affirmed that the commerce status the
district court afforded the red wolves was also within the judicially enforce-
able parameters reestablished by the Supreme Court in Lopez. 12 3 Following
the Lopez decision, forecasters from within the legal community predicted a
significant narrowing in the scope of congressional regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause. 24 However, supporters of the decision ren-
dered in Gibbs believe Lopez more conclusively signals the Court's success
in identifying meaningful standards defining the boundaries of congres-
sional authority pursuant the Commerce Clause.'25 The majority decision
in Gibbs indicates that even though Lopez metaphorically "raised the bar"
for Congress' attempts to apply Commerce Clause regulatory power, when
measuring the commercial benefits precipitated by endangered species,
some courts will attempt to define these concepts in broad terms.
To facilitate an understanding of Gibbs, a two-step analysis is con-
ducted focusing on the reasoning, criticism and ramifications of the deci-
sion. First, to properly understand the Fourth Circuit's analysis and poten-
tial criticism, the issues of the case must be reviewed in light of the decision
rendered. Second, following the case analysis an overview of the ramifica-
tions of Gibbs is conducted concentrating on what, if any, effect the deci-
sion is having on legal actions premised upon the Commerce Clause.
A. Reasoning & Criticism
The Fourth Circuit addressed the following three questions regarding
the reintroduction of experimental red wolf populations: 1) Were federally-
enacted regulations designed to protect red wolves a legitimate exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause; 2) Were protection ini-
tiatives prohibiting the taking of red wolves an integral cog in the overall
ESA regulatory scheme and subject to regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause; and 3) Did the FWS overstep its authority and infringe upon
traditional state functions by initiating anti-taking regulations on private
lands?
1. Commerce Power
In answering the question as to whether federally-enacted regulations
designed to protect red wolves are a legitimate exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause, the Fourth Circuit relied on the three
122. Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
123. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 487.
124. Hale, supra note 76.
125. Id
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categories under which Congress can legislate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause set forth in Lopez. 126 First, the court looked to determine if regulat-
ing the taking of red wolves on private lands involved the movement of
wolves within the channels of interstate commerce.12 7 The court decided it
did not and dismissed analysis under the first category.' 28 Second, the court
discussed whether wolves were things in interstate commerce.' 2 9 The court
reasoned that even though red wolves were occasionally transported across
state lines for the purpose of scientific study, these instances were isolated
and relatively insignificant. 13 0 However, in addressing the third category,
the court held the incidental takings of red wolves could significantly affect
interstate commerce, and therefore, the FWS establishment of takings regu-
lation in regard to the species was both appropriate and valid under the
Commerce Clause. 131
The Fourth Circuit reasoned, red wolf regulations were valid under the
third category of Lopez test based upon the premise that killing wolves
directly impacted interstate commerce in the areas of tourism, scientific re-
search, the potential commercial trade of wolf pelts, and agribusiness. 32 In
its analysis of wolf-related tourism, the court relied upon an unpublished
study conducted by Dr. William E. Rosen.' 33 The Rosen study predicted
increased tourism activities generated by red wolf introductions could even-
tually increase tourism expenditures within North Carolina to between
$39.61 and $183.65 million per year. 134 However, the court's reliance on
speculative tourism revenues provided by an unpublished study casts seri-
ous doubts over how significantly red wolf reintroductions will affect the
interstate commercial industry of tourism.
In its analysis of scientific research enhanced by red wolf introduc-
tions, the court focused upon the increased job opportunities generated as a
direct result of scientific study of the wolves. 13 5 In particular, the court
identified two studies which directly resulted from red wolf reintroduc-
tions. 136 The court maintained scientific research connected with the red
126. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490-91.
127. Id. at 490-91.
128. Id. at 491.
129. IM
130. Id.
131. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
132. ld- at 494-95.
133. ld. at 493.
134. Id. at 494.
135. Id.
136. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494; See Donald E. Moore f1 & Roland Smith, The Red Wolf as a Model
for Carnivore Reintroductions, 62 Symp. Zool. Soc. Land 263 (1990).
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wolves created potential for future studies and employment qualifying it as
an interstate market. 137 However, even though the reintroduction of red
wolves has already encouraged limited scientific studies, thus far economic
activity generated through scientific study has at best been only incremen-
tal.138
Additionally, in its analysis of future revenues generated by the estab-
lishment of a renewable trade in fur pelts, the court engaged in a compari-
son between the alligator-skin trade and the potential future of a wolf-pelt
trade. 139 The court discussed how reintroductions and protection of endan-
gered alligators during the mid-1970s allowed the species' numbers to re-
bound, parenting a vigorous skin trade by the late 1980s.140 With the aid of
a journal article, the court reasoned the reestablishment of a healthy red
wolf population could lead to a potential fur trade and provide another eco-
nomically-viable interstate market. 4 ' Despite the majority's speculative
assumptions, there has not been a commercial wolf-pelt trade in the United
States since the 1800s. 142 The court's broad interpretation of possible eco-
nomic benefits seems to step far outside the narrow parameters established
in both Lopez and Morrison. Indeed, in Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit seems
willing to not only stretch the meaning of economic activity but to redefine
economic activity to include speculative assumptions.
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit examined the red wolves' effects on
agribusiness. 43 The court maintained, whereas it was true the wolves
posed a detriment to livestock through predation, the overall affect of the
species' carnivorous nature could not be limited to a mere cursory glance of
the obvious effects on livestock.'" The court reasoned that because the
wolves also predated on wild animals responsible for crop destruction, the
overall benefits conferred by the species might economically outweigh the
harm caused to livestock. 45 Ultimately, the court provided no substantial
reasoning in support of its findings, and concluded it is Congress and not
the court that balances economic considerations. 46
137. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493; Brian T. Kelly, Alligator River National Wildlife Refitge Red Wolf
(Canis Rufus) Scat Analysis: Preliminary Analysis of Mammilian Prey Consumed by Year, Season,
Pack, Sex and Age (April 1994) (unpublished, Joint Appendix at 942).
138. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507.
139. Id. at 495.
140. Id.
141. Id.; See Catherine L. Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species Under Cities: Is it a
Sustainable Alternative? 7 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L 461, 479-80 (1996).
142. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507.
143. Id. at 495.
144. Il
145. Id.
146. Id.
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Though the Gibbs court purported to follow the guidelines set out by
Lopez and Morrison, it does not do so in effect. As stated above, the Court
in Lopez and Morrison cast the "substantial affects" of interstate commerce
in a different light than previously understood. While maintaining the ra-
tional review test for Commerce Clause challenges, Lopez and Morrison
add significant hurdles. Prior to Lopez and Morrison, to defend a statute or
regulation the government only had to prove that Congress had a rational
basis for believing an activity affected commerce and that the regulations
were reasonable and appropriate. 4 7 Applying the rational basis analysis to
the facts at issue, Congress could have rationally thought that the recovery
of endangered species had an effect on interstate commerce and prohibiting
the take of those animals was rationally related to preventing this from hap-
pening.
Under Lopez and Morrison's rational review with teeth analysis, the
Court tests federal legislation that claims to regulate commerce using four
elements: 1) the economic nature of the activity; 2) the required jurisdic-
tional element; 3) the existence of express congressional findings; 4) and an
examination to determine if the economic impact is too attenuated. 14 8
Gibbs examined only one of those factors, though it claimed to examine
two. The Fourth Circuit purported to determine if the regulated activity was
truly economic; however, all the court did was determine that the regulation
in question had a nexus to interstate commerce.
Though Lopez and Morrison set forth four elements for judicial review
of a regulation or statute challenged under the Commerce Clause, the Gibbs
court failed to address all of these. In Morrison, the Court refused to en-
force a law that regulated "noneconomic... conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce."' 4 9 The Gibbs court
stated that taking red wolves is an economic activity because "[t]he protec-
tion of commercial and economic assets is a primary reason for taking the
wolves."' 5 ° However, if all that is required of a regulated activity is that it
be economic in character and have substantial affects on interstate com-
merce, the only time the regulation of taking wolves would be constitu-
tional would be when the taking was done in defense of economic assets.
Conversely, if a person went out to kill wolves for pleasure it would not be
subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause because having fun is not
a truly economic activity. Therefore, according to the court's analysis, if
147. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258-59.
148. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
149. Id at 617.
150. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
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the killing of a red wolf is not done in protection of economic assets or
interests, it is not subject to regulation as an economic activity.
Additionally, Lopez and Morrison both discuss the Court's desire for a
jurisdictional element in the statute.15' In Lopez, the Court explained the
jurisdictional element would serve as a provision in the statute that would
limit those regulated by the statute to those with "an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce.""52 An example of jurisdictional ele-
ment for Gibbs would be: 1) the prohibition on taking red wolves only
applies to those who purchased the gun or ammunition with which they take
the wolf in interstate commerce; 2) those who will sell the story about the
taking of the wolf in interstate commerce; 3) those who will transport the
wolf in interstate commerce; or 4) those who may disturb the wolf with a
vehicle purchased in interstate commerce.' 53 There was no such jurisdic-
tional element in the regulation, yet the court did not consider the issue.
Furthermore, though the Fourth Circuit did not expressly discuss the
existence of congressional findings regarding the effect of the ESA on inter-
state commerce, it did touch on the issue. In the court's discussion of the
connection between the possibility of a renewed trade in pelts and interstate
commerce in mind, it quoted a Senate report that discussed the possibility
bolstering the population of endangered species to a "level where controlled
exploitation of that species can be resumed."' 54 Though the report certainly
sounds like Congress may have had an economic activity with effects on
interstate commerce in mind, the Senate report cited was in consideration of
The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969,11 which was repealed
by the ESA.'5 6
Finally, in the court's examination of the effects on interstate com-
merce, tourism, scientific research, agribusiness, and the possibility of a
renewed trade in pelts, it only discussed the nexus between the regulated
activity (taking of wolves) and the regulations' effect on interstate com-
merce instead of discussing how it is a truly economic activity. This is
contrary to the guidelines set forth in Morrison, which establish that even if
there is an indirect effect on interstate commerce due to some particular
activity, if the activity lacks the "but-for" causal chain it is too attenuated to
permit federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.15 7 Because the court
151. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
152. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
153. lId
154. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495 (citing S. Rep. 91-526 at 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1413, 1415).
155. Pub. Law 91-135 (1969).
156. Pub. Law 93-205 § 14 (1973).
157. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
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in Gibbs failed to properly analyze the causal connection between the tak-
ing of red wolves and alleged economic windfalls precipitated by the ani-
mals, the Fourth Circuit's findings were not grounded upon objective facts,
but rather, subjective reasoning.
2. Protection Initiatives as Part of a Larger Scheme
In answering the second question, the court held that protection initia-
tives aimed at limiting the taking of red wolves were an integral cog in the
overall ESA regulatory scheme, and thus warranted protection under the
Commerce Clause.' 58 The court concluded, when any species was classi-
fied under the ESA as threatened or endangered, the species' continued ex-
istence was viewed as essential in maintaining a flourishing environment,
and thus afforded stringent regulatory protection. 159 The appellants argued
the taking of a few individual wolves on private land would not signifi-
cantly affect wolves as a species for reintroduction efforts. 160 However, the
court disagreed, reasoning the aggregated, long-term effects of such takings
must be addressed.161 The court maintained the effect of commerce, when
viewed in the light of the Commerce Clause could not be measured by
analyzing the consequences of taking one member of a species, but rather
must be gauged by the latent economic differential between an extinct spe-
cies and a recovered species.16 Additionally, congressional efforts to pro-
tect endangered species under the ESA do not draw a distinction between
how far down the numbers of various species have dwindled and the
amount of protection they are provided.163
The court's analysis regarding whether red wolf protection initiatives
are an integral cog in the overall ESA regulatory scheme is based largely
upon the theory that the importance of red wolves cannot be analyzed in an
isolated vacuum when attempting to establish the long-term ramifications of
their reintroduction. 1" In support of this, the court presented a compelling
argument based on the importance of the species genetic value. 65 How-
ever, when the potential economic value of the red wolf is used to support
and crystallize the genetic value argument, the court missed the mark. By
examining the red wolf as an individual species, instead of its importance
within the entire ecosystem, the court lost the opportunity to show how
158. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 496.
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economically devastating extinction of the species could be to the ecosys-
tem as a whole.
1 66
For example, in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated that even though the extinction of one
species (in this case the Dehli Sands Flower-Loving Fly) may not have a
noticeable effect upon interstate commerce, because every species has a
distinct place in the ecosystem, the effect on the larger system to which the
species is a member, can be both ecologically and economically signifi-
cant. 167 Such an analysis allowed the circuit court to establish its own level
of certainty, and thus fits more closely within the general guidelines set
forth in Morrison.'68 Conversely, the court in Gibbs essentially abandoned
active rational review as set forth in Lopez and Morrison and passively
accepted unpublished findings and speculative predictions concerning the
economic value of red wolves.' 69 In conclusion, this portion of the decision
is not firmly grounded in valid legal precedent, and it is reasonable to as-
sume the decision would probably not withstand scrutiny of a Supreme
Court review.
3. Traditional State Functions
In answering the third and final question, the court held the FWS did
not overstep its authority under the ESA, nor infringe upon traditional state
functions by initiating regulations regarding the taking of red wolves on
private lands. 170 The appellants argued that regulation of red wolf popula-
tions by the federal government intruded upon the state's right to manage
wildlife species which are the property of the state. 7 ' The court disagreed,
reasoning that historically, state control over wildlife has been superceded
by federal regulatory power.'72 Additionally, the court maintained that in
the case of endangered species, regulatory procedures have never been an
exclusive or primary state function.1 73 The appellants countered federal
regulations restricting private land use infringed upon the state's police
power to regulate local lands.'74 However, the court maintained even
though species conservation imposed additional costs on private concerns,
prior precedent has upheld federal authority to regulate private lands to sup-
166. Brignac, supra note 64, at 883.
167. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
168. National Association of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 886.
169. See generally Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483.
170. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499.
171. Id at 499.
172. Id
173. Id at 500.
174. Id at 499.
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port wildlife and environmental conservation programs. 17 5
The court's analysis regarding whether the FWS overstepped the au-
thority granted to it by Congress under the ESA is the portion of the deci-
sion that is the most strongly supported federal statutory law. The ESA's
taking provision barred persons from harassing, harming, pursuing, hunting,
shooting, wounding, trapping, capturing, or collecting any endangered spe-
cies.'7 6 Even though the red wolf is classified as a threatened species, re-
striction encompassing its subsequent management are prescribed by the
FWS and supported by the ESA management scheme.' 7 7 In light of the
aforementioned factors, this portion of the decision seems to be firmly
grounded in statutory law.
B. Commerce Clause Ramifications
To establish Gibbs' effect on subsequent case law, it is necessary to
examine the decisions which have deferred to the Fourth Circuit's reason-
ing. Since the decision was rendered it has been cited in fifteen subsequent
cases. Unfortunately, the citing courts have followed Gibbs in an ad hoc
fashion. If there is an overarching principle enunciated by Gibbs that is
spilling into the area of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it would involve
the idea that commerce must be analyzed in very broad terms.
A prime example of this broadening is seen in Groome Resources
LTD, LLC v. Parish of Jefferson.'78 In this case, the Parish of Jefferson
challenged a portion of the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988179 on the
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause.' When discussing the constitutionality of the amendment, the
Fifth Circuit looked to not only Lopez and Morrison for precedent, 181 but
also to Gibbs.'82 Groome Resources relied upon Gibbs for the proposition
that courts continue to give a broad reading to the term "economic" when
addressing Commerce Clause challenges after Morrison. 18 3 The court con-
tinued, citing Gibbs' contention that "a cramped view of commerce would
cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would eviscerate national
175. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501.
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1973).
177. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 487-88.
178. 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A-C) (making housing discrimination against the handicapped ille-
gal).
180. Groome, 234 F.3d at 195.
181. Id. at 200-17.
182. Id at 208.
183. Id.
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authority." '184
The regulation of housing is probably more easily defined as being
economic in nature than the regulation of red wolves, suggesting the court
in Groome may have used Gibbs to illustrate the threshold of the Com-
merce Clause; if something as tenuously related to commerce as wolves
could be regulated, then certainly housing could be regulated as well. The
nature of the regulation in Groome did not require the use of Gibbs for
validity. However the court pointed to the case to show that since Lopez
and Morrison, courts have not applied the narrower standard, favoring a
broader understanding of commerce despite Supreme Court precedent to the
contrary.
In reverting back to the pre-Lopez philosophy of defining interstate
commerce in broad terms, recent decisions advocating Gibbs' liberal inter-
pretation of quasi-economic activity clearly denounce the spirit of Lopez
and Morrison. In regard to both the former and the latter, the Supreme
Court's message is both poignant and on point, "... in every case where we
have sustained federal regulation under Wickard's aggregation principle,
the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character." '85 Unfor-
tunately, courts across the land are riding on the coattails of Gibbs while
nipping at the heels of the concept of "commercial character," thus serving
to further muddy already turbid waters. Indeed, while there is limited evi-
dence supporting the contention that some post-Gibbs case law reveals in-
cremental Commerce Clause broadening, it would be presumptive to argue
there is any clearly-marked pattern emerging. In reality, subsequent cases
have tended to cite Gibbs to help support whatever argument they are mak-
ing at the time. In fact, many of these decisions fail to recognize distinc-
tions arising between Gibbs, Lopez, and Morrison, remaining only too con-
tent to incorrectly cite these cases together to stand for the same proposi-
tion. Gibbs represents a crystallization of the courts' inability to follow the
narrow standard provided by Lopez and Morrison. Misunderstanding the
new Commerce Clause jurisprudence as set forth in Lopez and Morrison
appears to be the only constant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though the court in Gibbs purported to decide the case in light of the
relatively recent developments in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it failed
in almost all respects. The Court in Lopez identified four specific elements
which must be satisfied when assessing if an activity rises to the level of
substantially affecting interstate commerce. As previously discussed, these
184. Ia-
185. Morrison 529 U.S. at 672, citing Lopez 514 U.S. at 559-60, 580.
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necessary elements are the economic nature, jurisdictional element, con-
gressional findings, and nexus between the regulated activity economic im-
pact.
When considering the economic nature of the regulation, instead of
determining whether the prohibition of killing wolves was truly economic,
the Fourth Circuit merely talked about the economic impact of the regula-
tion. The court avoided any discussion of a jurisdictional element in the
regulation, though the Court in both Lopez and Morrison expressed the ne-
cessity of such an element to limit the reach of the regulation. The court
also touched on the existence of congressional findings, though it did so
incorrectly. Additionally, even though the court never provided any type of
discussion regarding the existence of congressional findings, it did men-
tioned the existence of such findings. Unfortunately, the congressional
findings the court cited were in support of the Endangered Species Conser-
vation Act of 1969, which was repealed by the ESA. It has been argued
that the 1.969 act was a precursor to the 1973 ESA, and in fact Congress
adopted the more hard-hitting regulatory regime of the 1973 ESA only after
finding that its earlier efforts were not working. 18 6 Thus, doubts have been
expressed that Congress changed its mind about the importance of endan-
gered species protection vis-a-vis trade and other matters between 1969 and
1973.187 Additionally, claims have been leveled that Congress felt the
same, if not more strongly, about the importance of endangered species
protection by 1973 and thus enacted the ESA to ensure that endangered
species were actually protected. 88 Finally, the Fourth Circuit only ex-
amined the nexus between the regulated activity and its effect on interstate
commerce, through its discussion of tourism, scientific research, possible
renewed trade in pelts, and the effect of agribusiness.
Undoubtedly, the Fourth Circuit only conducted a cursory analysis of
the criteria specifically enumerated in Lopez. It appears the court, in its
attempt to keep the regulation of endangered species exclusively federal,
ignored the Supreme Court precedent set forth in Lopez defining the param-
eters of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
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